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We develop a new approach for solving the optimal retirement problem for an individual with an unhedgeable
income risk. The income risk stems from a forced unemployment event, which occurs as an exponentially-
distributed random shock. The optimal retirement problem is to determine an individual’s optimal consump-
tion and investment behaviors and optimal retirement time simultaneously. We introduce a new convex-
duality approach for reformulating the original retirement problem and provide an iterative numerical method
to solve it. Reasonably calibrated parameters say that our model can give an explanation for lower con-
sumption and risky investment behaviors of individuals, and for relatively higher stock holdings of the poor.
We also analyze the sensitivity of an individual’s optimal behavior in changing her wealth level, investment
opportunity, and the magnitude of preference for post-retirement leisure. Finally, we find that our model
explains a counter-cyclical pattern of the number of unemployed job leavers.
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1. Introduction
Starting from pioneering works by Merton (1969, 1971), intertemporal models of optimal consump-
tion and portfolio choice have evolved into some interesting generalizations. Among them, Bodie
et al. (1992), Heaton and Lucas (1997), Koo (1998), Viceira (2001), Farhi and Panageas (2007)
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and others explored life-cycle models in which non-tradable labor income is incorporated into the
problem of optimal consumption and portfolio choice.
Bodie et al. (1992) examine the impact of labor flexibility on an individual’s optimal behav-
ior including consumption and risky investment under the assumption that the labor supply is
certain over the life cycle. Heaton and Lucas (1997) and Koo (1998) investigate how uncertain
income stream can affect an individual’s optimal consumption and investment behavior. Further,
Viceira (2001) illustrates an individual’s optimal behaviors when she faces an exogenous shock
of retirement, assuming that exogenous retirement shocks and mortality risks arrive in a random
way, but with constant probabilities. Farhi and Panageas (2007) investigate an individual’s opti-
mal consumption, investment and retirement behaviors simultaneously under the assumption that
the individual’s income rate is certain while working. All these papers permit only one of the
following two assumptions, not both: risky labor income or endogenous (or voluntary) retirement
opportunity.
Considering both income risks and endogenous retirement opportunity in the classical life-cycle
models is a complicated job. Only a few researchers such as Liu and Neis (2003), Bodie et al. (2004),
Dybvig and Liu (2010), and Jang et al. (2013) have successfully resolved the optimal voluntary
retirement problems with income risks, but they consider a complete market in which income risks
can be hedged away by purchasing and selling some financial instruments traded in that market.
This paper deals with both income risks and endogenous retirement in an incomplete market.
We assume individuals cannot eliminate income risks because they stem from exogenously forced
unemployment events, and investigate the individual’s optimal consumption, portfolio choice, and
retirement behaviors in this serious situation.
Investigating the impact of income risks from unemployment events on an individual’s optimal
behaviors has been an important task for economists. Caroll (1992) shows that an unemployment
event could have a major impact on an individual’s current consumption and saving behaviors.
Cocco et al. (2005) show that even a 0.05% probability of being unemployed in any given year
has a large effect on an individual’s portfolio choice, particularly early in life. Further, Wachter
and Yogo (2010) stress the fact that unemployment risks could be significant for the poor in the
sense that the optimal amount of risky investment increases at a sufficiently low wealth level.
Also, Lynch and Tan (2011) show that the amount invested in the risky assets could be relatively
lower in a persistent unemployment state and assert that the unemployment state pays only 10%
of permanent labor income.1 This paper might give a significant impetus to clarify the effect of
unhedgeable unemployment risks on an individual’s optimal behaviors in an incomplete market.
From a technical standpoint, solving financial problems constructed in an incomplete market,
such as pricing derivatives and choosing an investor’s optimal consumption and investment strate-
gies, is extremely complex due to the non-uniqueness of the equivalent martingale measure, and
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obtaining a closed-form solution of the problems is hardly possible. Just a little literature, such as
Kim and Omberg (1996), Chacko and Viceira (2005), Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005), and Liu
(2007), have provided closed-form solutions of financial problems defined in an incomplete market.
It is well-known that there are two approaches for solving financial problems derived from an
incomplete market: the dynamic programming approach (DPA) and the martingale approach (MA).
Koo (1998) and Henderson (2005) exploit the DPA to solve optimal consumption and investment
problems incorporating labor income risks. They derive a non-linear partial differential equation
and solve it. He and Pearson (1991), Svensson and Werner (1993), Tepla´ (2000), and Keppo et al.
(2007) apply the MA to solve financial problems in the presence of income risks in an incomplete
market.
Most existing literature concerning income risks, no matter they are hedgeable or unhedgeable,
model the income stream as a standard geometric Brownian motion, which permits use of the MA.
For instance, Karatzas et al. (1991) and He and Pearson (1991) suggest choosing the minimum
local equivalent martingale measure with respect to unhedgable risks represented by a geometric
Brownian motion (GBM). Further, Duffie et al. (1997) introduce a viscosity solution technique for
solving portfolio choice problems in incomplete markets where a stochastic income evolved by a
GBM cannot be hedged by utilizing a traded risky asset. However, we assume the income risks
originally stem from forced unemployment events and such exogenous unemployment events occur
following an exponential distribution with positive intensity. This kind of model is new in the
optimal retirement literature, and a new approach is developed by using the DPA for solving the
optimal retirement problem with the income risks. Specifically, we derive a differential equation
and develop an iterative numerical method to solve it. As far as we know, this is the first paper to
develop a method for solving the optimal retirement problem with a down-jump event of income
which is modeled not using any Brownian motion.
With reasonably calibrated parameters we obtain some interesting features concerning an indi-
vidual’s optimal behaviors and income risks in the incomplete market. In our model, we find
• income risks stemming from forced unemployment events might significantly lower an individ-
ual’s consumption, investment in a risky asset and voluntary retirement wealth level,
• income risks stemming from forced unemployment events might be an explanation for the
findings of Cocco et al. (2005), Benzoni et al. (2007), and Lynch and Tan (2011), in that stock
holdings in cash-on-hand can increase at a sufficiently low wealth level,
• certainty equivalent wealth gain, the maximum wealth that an individual is willing to give up
in exchange for the market without unemployment risks, decreases as wealth and/or investment
opportunity grow(s), and
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• certainty equivalent wealth gain has a bigger value for an individual with a higher preference
of leisure after retirement.
The first finding about voluntary retirement wealth level could be an explanation of a counter-
cyclical pattern of the number of unemployed job leavers who have voluntarily left their current jobs;
the proportion of job leavers increases during economic recessions and decreases during economic
expansions.2 Our result says that soaring income risks due to forced unemployment events during
economic recessions induce myopic investors3 who have slightly smaller wealth than the voluntary
retirement wealth level planned during the past economic expansion to enter early retirement.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we establish a financial market with forced
unemployment events and formulate our problem in the market. We also introduce a new dual
approach and an iterative numerical method to solve the problem. In section 3 we display some
analytical results including optimal consumption and investment strategies of an individual, and
in section 4 we show numerical implications of our model in a normal market. In section 5 we
analyze the relationship between the number of job leavers and business cycles and in Section 6
we conclude the paper.
2. The Model
2.1. The Financial Market
Following the conventional models, we assume an individual can trade two assets in the financial
market: a bond (or a risk-free asset) and a stock (or a risky asset). The bond price Bt evolves by
the relationship
dBt = rBtdt,
where the positive constant value r is considered to be a risk-free interest rate. On the other hand,
the stock price St follows
dSt = µStdt+σStdWt,
where µ (µ> r) is the expected rate of the stock return, σ > 0 is the stock volatility, and Wt is a
standard Brownian motion defined on a suitable probability space.
We assume that the individual is in the workforce at the beginning and wants to retire volun-
tarily someday in the future. The individual receives income at the rate of I1 from labor. She is
exposed to forced (or involuntary) unemployment risks such that she loses her job by compulsion
whenever an exogenous unemployment shock arrives before the voluntary retirement date. Accord-
ingly, she obtains income at the rate of I2 (I2 < I1) after the forced unemployment event. The
forced unemployment event occurs following an exponential distribution with intensity δ, namely;
for some time t≥ 0
probability of {τU ≤ t}= 1− e−δt,
Alain Bensoussan, Bong-Gyu Jang, and Seyoung Park: Unemployment Risks and Optimal Retirement in an Incomplete Market
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2013-08-441.R2 5
where τU is the forced unemployment time.
4
We have two risk sources: the market risk (or the Brownian motion Wt) and the unemployment
risk (or the Poisson arrival time τU). The market risk is hedgeable and can be partially diversified
away by controlling dollar investment amount in the stock, but the unemployment risk cannot be
hedgeable. Elmendorf and Kimball (2000) and Gormley et al. (2010) emphasize the important role
of insurance against large and negative wealth shocks such as unemployment risks on an individual’s
optimal investment strategies. However, private insurance markets for hedging labor income risks
are not sufficiently competitive compared to other insurance markets (Cocco et al. 2005). From the
realistic point of view, we are assuming that there is no financial vehicle to eliminate or diminish
the forced unemployment risks, thus, the financial market is considered to be incomplete. For
the technical simplicity, we assume that the Brownian motion and the Poisson arrival event are
independent.5
2.2. The Retirement Problem
The retirement problem explored in this paper can be thought of as a variation of the problem
investigated by Farhi and Panageas (2007), but it allows an individual to be exposed to forced
unemployment risks.
The individual has the following time-additive utility function of Cobb-Douglas type:
U(l(t), c(t))≡ 1
a
ln(l(t)1−ac(t)a),
where c(t) is per-period consumption and l(t) is leisure at time t, and a is a weight for consumption
satisfying 0<a< 1. We consider a binomial choice of leisure, in which the individual either works
full time or she is retired permanently.6 More specifically, the individual enjoys leisure l(t) = l1
while she is working and l(t) = l2 (l1 < l2) when she retires. We assume that the wage rate w is
constant and, then, the individual gets an income of I1 =w(l2− l1)> 0 per unit time during working
status. We also assume she gets I2 > 0 (I1 > I2) per unit time after retirement.
7 The assumption
of a positive income after retirement reflects the fact that most countries provide unemployment
allowances and other public welfare services for retired people.
The wealth process X(t) of the individual is given by
dX(t) =
{(
rX(t)− c(t) + I1
)
dt+pi(t)σ(dW (t) + θdt), for 0≤ t < τ ∧ τU ,(
rX(t)− c(t) + I2
)
dt+pi(t)σ(dW (t) + θdt), for t≥ τ ∧ τU ,
where pi is the dollar amount invested in the stock and θ represents the Sharpe ratio (µ−r)/σ. The
individual accumulates wealth at the rates of rX − c+ I1 (rX − c+ I2) before (after, respectively)
voluntary or involuntary retirement. Note that the individual is exposed to forced unemployment
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risks and, thus, her labor income rate will decrease from I1 to I2 at the unemployment event. She is
also exposed to the market risk stemming from stock investment and simultaneously compensated
by the market premium, pi(µ− r).
We assume that the individual can borrow money with her human capital. Following Friedman
(1957) and Hall (1978) we define human capital h as the present value of future labor income
discounted by the risk-free interest rate r:8
h=E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtI1dt
]
=
I1
r
.
Then we impose a natural wealth constraint as the following:9
X(t)>−I1
r
, for t≥ 0. (1)
This implies that the individual can consume and invest in the stock as long as her wealth level
is above −I1/r. If the wealth level approaches −I1/r, she cannot consume and invest in the stock
any more, i.e., consumption c and risky investment pi should be zero. We exclude such trivial case
and just consider the cases in the presence of the wealth constraint (1). We call the consumption
and investment strategies satisfying the wealth constraint admissible strategies.
We normalize leisure prior to retirement as l1 = 1, then the utility function during working should
be
U1(c)≡U(1, c) = ln c.
We also let
K ≡ l 1α−12 > 1,
which represents the preference for leisure after retirement. The retirement problem is to find
the maximum of the individual’s expected utility for consumption. The individual would like to
maximize the utility by controlling her consumption c, risky portfolio pi, and voluntary retirement
time τ , i.e., the individual willingly obtains the following value function:
Φ(x)≡ max
(c,pi,τ)
E
[∫ τ∧τU
0
e−βtU1
(
c(t)
)
dt+ e−β(τ∧τU )
∫ ∞
τ∧τU
e−β(t−τ∧τU )U1
(
Kc(t)
)
dt
]
, (2)
where X(0) = x>−I1/r is initial wealth of the individual and β > 0 is the individual’s subjective
discount rate. By utilizing the conditional expectation of τU , we can rewrite the individual’s the
value function Φ(x) given by (2) as the following:10
Φ(x) = max
(c,pi,τ)
E
[∫ τ
0
e−(β+δ)t
{
U1
(
c(t)
)
+ δU2
(
X(t)
)}
dt+ e−(β+δ)τU2
(
X(τ)
)]
, (3)
where
U2(z) =
1
β
[
ln
{
β
(
z+
I2
r
)}
+
1
β
(
r+
θ2
2
−β(1− lnK)
)]
, for z > 0.
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In fact, U2(z) is the value function of the classical Merton’s problem with infinite investment
horizon under the condition that the individual has a logarithmic utility and an income stream I2
forever.
In our model, it is possible for an individual to involuntarily retire with negative wealth at the
forced unemployment date. It makes our problem difficult to be well-defined because U2 is not
defined in the region of (−I1/r,−I2/r]. We extend our problem into the problem defined in the
region of (−I1/r,∞), which contains some negative values of wealth, by assuming that the post-
retirement value function U2(z) is continuous at z = 0 and the first derivative U
′
2(z) equals to zero
for z < 0.11 Specifically, we assume that
U2(z) =

1
β
[
ln
{
β
(
z+
I2
r
)}
+
1
β
(
r+
θ2
2
−β(1− lnK)
)]
, for z > 0,
1
β
[
ln
(
β
I2
r
)
+
1
β
(
r+
θ2
2
−β(1− lnK)
)]
, for z ≤ 0.
2.3. Problem Reformulation
2.3.1. A new convex-duality approach We utilize the conventional dynamic programming
approach to resolve our retirement problem in an incomplete financial market. For a fixed stopping
time τ , we define
Jτ (x)≡max
(c,pi)
E
[∫ τ
0
e−(β+δ)t
{
U1
(
c(t)
)
+ δU2
(
X(t)
)}
dt+ e−(β+δ)τU2
(
X(τ)
)]
.
Then the value function Φ(x) given by (3) is rewritten as
Φ(x) = max
τ
Jτ (x). (4)
To solve the optimal stopping problem (4) we use the variational inequality approach. Variational
Inequalities for the problem of this kind have been introduced by Bensoussan and Lions (1982)
and Øksendal (2007). We will refer to Øksendal (2007) in the paper.12 In fact, we can derive the
following inequality:
(β+ δ)φ(x)− (rx+ I1)φ′(x) + θ
2
2
φ′(x)2
φ′′(x)
+ 1 + lnφ′(x)≥ δU2(x),
φ(x)≥U2(x),[
(β+ δ)φ(x)− (rx+ I1)φ′(x) + θ
2
2
φ′(x)2
φ′′(x)
+ 1 + lnφ′(x)− δU2(x)
](
φ(x)−U2(x)
)
= 0,
(5)
for any x>−I1/r.
The retirement problem can be characterized by two regions: the continuation region where
the individual works receiving labor income and the stopping region where she optimally enters
voluntary retirement. The first inequality in (5) implies that the equality holds in the continuation
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region and the strict inequality holds in the stopping region. Moreover, if the strict inequality in
the second inequality in (5) holds, i.e., if the value function prior to voluntary retirement is strictly
larger than the value function after retirement, then the individual is in the continuation region and
delay voluntary retirement. If the value function prior to retirement approaches the value function
after retirement (i.e., the equality holds in the second inequality in (5)), then the individual is in
the stopping region and, hence, optimally enters voluntary retirement. Note that for each value of
x>−I1/r one of the first two equalities must hold, and, thus, we need the third equality in (5).
The continuation region and stopping region are determined by the so-called critical wealth level,
over which it is optimal for an individual to enter voluntary retirement. Thus, we conjecture that
the retirement problem can be solved by finding an optimal stopping boundary, or equivalently,
a free boundary xˆ, which can be characterized by value matching and smooth pasting conditions.
The problem can be formulated as follows:
(β+ δ)φ(x)− (rx+ I1)φ′(x) + θ
2
2
φ′(x)2
φ′′(x)
+ 1 + lnφ′(x) = δU2(x), − I1
r
< x< xˆ,
φ(x) =U2(x), x≥ xˆ,
φ(xˆ) =U2(xˆ),
φ′(xˆ) =
1
β
1
xˆ+ I2
r
,
(6)
where xˆ is the critical wealth level. If we find φ(x) satisfying C1 and piecewise C2, verifying the
inequalities in the variational inequality (5) everywhere, then φ(x) in (6) is indeed a solution of
the variational inequality (5).13 Further, it is straightforward to verify that the solution φ(x) of
(5) is equivalent to the solution Φ(x) of our optimal stopping problem (4) (see Theorem 10.4.1 in
Øksendal, 2007).14
Now, we introduce a dual variable λ; we define the marginal value of the value function φ(x) as
the variable λ. Then the critical wealth level xˆ has an inverse relationship between the variable λ
by the last equation in (6). Specifically,
λ(x)≡ φ′(x) and λˆ≡ 1
β
1
xˆ+ I2
r
.
If we differentiate the first equation in (6) with respect to x and take the left derivative coefficient
as the derivative coefficient of U2(x) at x= 0, then we obtain
λ(x)(θ2+β+δ−r)+ λ
′(x)
λ(x)
−λ′(x)(rx+I1)− 1
2
θ2λ(x)
2 λ
′′(x)
λ′(x)2
=

δ
β
1
x+ I2
r
, if 0<x≤ xˆ,
0, if − I1
r
< x≤ 0.
(7)
We introduce a modification of the conventional convex-duality approach by Karatzas and Shreve
(1998) to solve our incomplete market problem. At first, we define a function G(·) which is the
so-called convex-dual function15 by
G
(
λ(x)
)≡ x+ I1
r
. (8)
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Hence, we get the following relationships:
G′
(
λ(x)
)
λ′(x) = 1 and G′′
(
λ(x)
)
λ′(x)2 +G′
(
λ(x)
)
λ′′(x) = 0. (9)
For the notational convenience, we let G
(
λ(x)
)
=G and λ(x) = λ. Then by using the relationships
given by (9), the equation (7) becomes
λ(θ2 +β+ δ− r) + 1
λ
1
G′
− rG
G′
+
1
2
θ2λ2
G′′
G′
=

δ
β
1
G− I1
r
+ I2
r
, if G>
I1
r
0, if 0<G≤ I1
r
.
(10)
If we rearrange the equation (10) and rewrite the last equation in (6) by using the definition (8)
of the convex-dual function G, we obtain the following equations for λ> λˆ:
−1
2
θ2λ2G′′(λ)−λG′(λ)(θ2 +β+ δ− r) + rG(λ) + δ
β
G′(λ)
G(λ)− I1
r
+ I2
r
1{G(λ)> I1
r
}= 1
λ
,
G(λˆ) =
1
βλˆ
+
I1− I2
r
,
(11)
where
1{G(λ)> I1
r
}=

1, if G(λ)>
I1
r
,
0, if 0<G(λ)≤ I1
r
.
We add one more constraint,
G(∞) = 0, (12)
which implies the individual’s marginal utility λ goes to infinity as initial wealth x goes down to
−I1
r
, which is the lower bound for initial wealth x.
Technically, for the case of δ= 0, without any forced unemployment risks, the problem formulated
by equations in (11) and (12) has an analytic solution, whereas the problem for the case of δ > 0 is
unlikely to have an explicit solution. To solve the problem for δ > 0, we first verify the existence of a
solution satisfying equations in (11) and (12) in Appendix 7.1. For the next, we successfully obtain
an analytic solution given by an implicit equation and develop an iterative numerical method to
solve the implicit equation in the subsequent section.
2.3.2. The iterative method First, we define αδ > 0 and α
∗
δ < 0 as the two roots of
F (α; δ)≡−1
2
θ2α(α− 1) +α(β+ δ− r) + r= 0.
We conjecture the general solution of (11) as
G(λ) =
1
λ(β+ δ)
+A(λ)λ−αδ +A∗(λ)λ−α
∗
δ (13)
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subject to
A′(λ)λ−αδ + (A∗(λ))′λ−α
∗
δ = 0.
Putting the relationship in (13) into (11), we get
G(λ) =
1
λ(β+ δ)
+B(λˆ)λ−αδ +
2δ
θ2(αδ −α∗δ)β
[
(αδ − 1)λ−αδ
∫ λ
λˆ
µαδ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
+(α∗δ − 1)λ−α∗δ
∫ ∞
λ
µα
∗
δ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
]
,
(14)
for λ> λˆ and
1
βλˆ
+
I1− I2
r
=
1
λˆ(β+ δ)
+B(λˆ)λˆ−αδ +
2δ
θ2(αδ −α∗δ)β
[
(α∗δ − 1)λˆ−α
∗
δ
∫ ∞
λˆ
µα
∗
δ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}]
dµ
]
,
(15)
for
B(λˆ)≡A(λˆ) + 2δ
θ2(αδ −α∗δ)β
λˆαδ−1 ln
1
λˆ
.
Here, (
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
= max
{
G(µ)− I1
r
,0
}
.
Moreover, the relationship of φ(xˆ) =U2(xˆ) in (6) implies
θ2
2
δ
β(β+ δ)
(1−αδ) + lnK
=
δ
β
lnβλˆ+ λˆ(I1− I2)
(
1 +
αδθ
2
2r
)
− δ(α
∗
δ − 1)
β
λˆ−α
∗
δ+1
∫ ∞
λˆ
µα
∗
δ−2 ln
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ.
(16)
The derivations of the relationships in (14) and (16) are in an online Appendix. Further, in
Appendix 7.2 we prove the uniqueness of G(·) and the free boundary λˆ, and the strictly decreasing
property of G(·).
Now we state an iterative numerical method to find the solution G(·) of (11).16
The iterative procedure:
Step 0. Notice that, if δ= 0, we can easily get B(λˆ) from (15) and, thus, obtain G(λ) from (14).
Putting this G(λ) into (16), we get λˆ. Suppose δ 6= 0, but has a sufficiently small value.17 We exploit
G(λ) and λˆ for the case where δ= 0 as the initial values of our iteration method.
Step 1. Since we have an initial λˆ and G(λ), we can get B(λˆ) from (15).
Step 2. Update G(λ) by using equation (14).
Step 3. Putting the updated G(λ) into (16), we can obtain a new λˆ.
Step 4. Repeat steps 1, 2 and 3 until λˆ converges.
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3. Analytical Results
3.1. Lower and Upper Bounds for Critical Wealth Level
Even though it is hard to have a closed form of the threshold level xˆ in the optimal stopping
problem (6), we can derive analytical lower and upper bounds.
To simplify notation, set Lδ to be the left hand side of (16) and ψδ(λˆ) to be its right hand side,
that is, we let
Lδ ≡ θ
2
2
δ
β(β+ δ)
(1−αδ) + lnK,
ψδ(λˆ)≡ δ
β
lnβλˆ+ λˆ(I1− I2)(1 + αδθ
2
2r
)
− δ(α
∗
δ − 1)
β
λˆ−α
∗
δ+1
∫ ∞
λˆ
µα
∗
δ−2 ln
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ.
Moreover, we define two functions
φ
δ
(λˆ)≡ δ
β
lnβλˆ+ λˆ(I1− I2)(1 + αδθ
2
2r
)
and
φδ(λˆ)≡
δ
β
lnβλˆ+ λˆ(I1− I2)(1 + αδθ
2
2r
) +
δ
β
ln
(
max
{ 1
βλˆ
,
I2
r
})
,
which can be lower and upper bounds of ψδ(λˆ) respectively.
Proposition 3.1. If I2 ≥ r,
λ0δ ≤ λˆ≤ λ1δ, (17)
where λ0δ and λ
1
δ are found by
φδ(λ
0
δ) =Lδ and φδ(λ
1
δ) =Lδ.
Proof. It is obvious that
ψδ(λˆ)≥ φδ(λˆ). (18)
Since
(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
≤max
{ 1
βλˆ
,
I2
r
}
, under the assumption of I2 ≥ r,
ψδ(λˆ)≤ δ
β
lnβλˆ+ λˆ(I1− I2)(1 + αδθ
2
2r
) +
δ
β
ln
(
max
{ 1
βλˆ
,
I2
r
})
= φδ(λˆ). (19)
Since both φδ(λˆ) and φδ(λˆ) are monotonically-increasing and continuous functions with
φδ(0) = φδ(0) =−∞, and
φδ(+∞) = φδ(+∞) = +∞,
(20)
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λ0δ and λ
1
δ are lower and upper bounds for λˆ. Q.E.D.
The upper and lower bounds for the critical wealth level xˆ, at which the individual enters vol-
untary retirement, also can be written as
G(λ1δ)−
I1
r
≤ xˆ≤G(λ0δ)−
I1
r
,
if we use the result in the proposition and the definition of function G(·) in (8). Notice that φ
δ
(λ1δ)
becomes φδ(λ
0
δ), or equivalently, the upper and lower boundaries in the proposition are identical,
where intensity δ is zero. For this case, the boundaries become the corresponding critical wealth
level described in Farhi and Panageas (2007), in which individuals are not exposed to any forced
unemployment risk.
3.2. Optimal Consumption and Investment Strategies
We find the optimal consumption and investment strategies by exploiting the terms of λˆ, B(·) and
G(·), which can be obtained by the iterative numerical method in the previous section.
Theorem 1. The optimal consumption c and risky portfolio pi are given as
c(t) = (β+ δ)
(
x+
I1
r
)
− (β+ δ)B(λˆ)λ∗(x)−αδ
− 2δ(β+ δ)
θ2(αδ −α∗δ)β
[
(αδ − 1)λ∗(x)−αδ
∫ λ∗(x)
λˆ
µαδ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
+ (α∗δ − 1)λ∗(x)−α
∗
δ
∫ ∞
λ∗(x)
µα
∗
δ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
]
,
(21)
pi(t) =
θ
σ
1
λ∗(x)(β+ δ)
+
θ
σ
αδB(λˆ)λ
∗(x)−αδ − 2δ
σθβλ∗(x)
lnβ(x+
I2
r
)
+
2δ
σθ(αδ −α∗δ)β
[
αδ(αδ − 1)λ∗(x)−αδ
∫ λ∗(x)
λˆ
µαδ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
+α∗δ(α
∗
δ − 1)λ∗(x)−α
∗
δ
∫ ∞
λ∗(x)
µα
∗
δ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
]
,
(22)
where λ∗(x) is a decreasing function with respect to wealth x and the solution of
x+
I1
r
=
1
λ∗(x)(β+ δ)
+B(λˆ)λ∗(x)−αδ
+
2δ
θ2(αδ −α∗δ)β
[
(αδ − 1)λ∗(x)−αδ
∫ λ∗(x)
λˆ
µαδ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
+ (α∗δ − 1)λ∗(x)−α
∗
δ
∫ ∞
λ∗(x)
µα
∗
δ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
]
and
B(λˆ) = λˆαδ
[ δ
β(β+ δ)
1
λˆ
+
I1− I2
r
− 2δ
θ2(αδ −α∗δ)β
{
(α∗δ − 1)λˆ−α
∗
δ
∫ ∞
λˆ
µα
∗
δ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
}]
.
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Proof. The relationship (8) and the first-order conditions with respect to c(t) and pi(t), which
were used in deriving the variational inequality (5), yield the optimal consumption c(t) and risky
portfolio proportion pi(t). Q.E.D.
The optimal consumption, cM , of the classical Merton’s (1969, 1971) problem in the presence of
the income I1 is represented as
cM(t) = β
(
x+
I1
r
)
,
so the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of wealth,
∂ct
∂x
, is constant. However, in our
model without any forced unemployment risk, namely δ = 0, the first and second terms of the
right hand side of (21), which spring up due to the voluntary retirement event, yield the optimal
consumption
cV R(t) = β
(
x+
I1
r
)
−βB(λˆ)λ∗(x)−α0 .
This implies the MPC out of wealth should be positive and the optimal consumption is a concave
function with respect to wealth. Since B(λˆ)> 0 for δ= 0, the individual with voluntary retirement
option consumes relatively less than the one in the classical Merton problem because she is likely
to accumulate wealth by cutting down her consumption to enter retirement early. Moreover, since
λ∗ is a decreasing function with respect to wealth level the effect of the voluntary retirement
option on her consumption behavior becomes significant as her wealth increases. This might be an
explanation of the finding that individuals could dramatically decrease their consumption near the
critical wealth level (Farhi and Panageas 2007, Dybvig and Liu 2010).
The third term of the right hand side of (21) consists of two parts which are closely associated
with the impact of income risks stemming from forced unemployment events. Notice that the first
(integral) part gives a negative effect to the individual’s consumption and the second (integral) part
affects it conversely. As an individual’s wealth approaches the critical wealth level xˆ, λ∗(x) gets
closer to λˆ, and subsequently, in the limit case the first part disappears and the second part has a
fixed value. Hence, if an individual’s wealth reaches near the critical wealth level, the third term
of the right hand side in (21) could make a positive impact on the individual’s consumption and
offset the negative impact of the second term of the right hand side in (21), which stands for the
voluntary retirement option value. So it might be possible for people facing forced unemployment
risks to consume more than individuals not exposed to those, near retirement time.
When it comes to the optimal risky investment, the classical Merton’s (1969, 1971) strategy, piM ,
must be
piM(t) =
θ
σ
(
x+
I1
r
)
.
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However, using the first and second terms of the right hand side of (22) we can get the optimal
risky portfolio, piV R, for the case where there exists no forced unemployment risk, i.e., δ= 0:
piV R(t) =
θ
σ
(
x+
I1
r
)
+
θ
σ
α0B(λˆ)λ
∗(x)−α0 . (23)
Notice that the second term of (23) is associated with voluntary retirement and is a positive and
increasing function with respect to initial wealth x. An individual permitted voluntary retirement is
willing to take more risk than one considered in the classical Merton’s set-up. Also it seems that the
risky investment, piV R, increases according to the growth of an individual’s wealth level. Intuitively,
people who have slightly smaller wealth than the critical wealth level give their attention to retire
voluntarily as soon as possible, so they tend to invest more in risky assets even though they may
end up losing relatively large amounts of money. Similar observations were reported by Farhi and
Panageas (2007) and Dybvig and Liu (2010).
The third and fourth terms of the right hand side of (22) are closely associated with involuntary
unemployment. Notice that the third term is negative, so it decreases an individual’s stockholding,
while the forth term consisting of two integral parts urges stock investment.
We can get an upper bound of pi where individual’s wealth goes up to a sufficiently close level
to the critical wealth level and a lower bound where individual’s wealth goes down to zero:
Corollary 3.1. For I2 ≤ r
βλˆ
lim
x↑xˆ
pi(t)≤ θ
σ
1
λˆ(β+ δ)
+
θ
σ
αδB(λˆ)λˆ
−αδ − 2δαδ
σθ(αδ −α∗δ)βλˆ
ln
1
λˆ
.
Moreover,
lim
x↓0
pi(t)≥ θ
σ
1
λ∗(x)(β+ δ)
+
θ
σ
αδB(λˆ)λ
∗(x)−αδ − 2δαδ
σθ(αδ −α∗δ)β
ln
(βI2
r
)
λ∗(x)−αδ λˆαδ−1.
Proof. We first utilize inequality
(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
≤max
{ 1
βλˆ
,
I2
r
}
, and take the limit of λ∗ ↓ λˆ
to derive the last term of the right hand side of the first inequality. On the other hand, the last
term of the right hand side of the second inequality is derived if we use G(µ)≥ 0 for all µ and
take the limit of x ↓ 0. Q.E.D.
4. Numerical Implications
In this section, we investigate the behaviors of critical wealth level, optimal consumption, and opti-
mal risky investment in economically reasonable circumstances. We exploit the iterative procedure
in Section 2.3.2.
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µ σ K
δ 0.1023 0.1123 0.1223 0.1854 0.1954 0.2054 2 3 4
0 67.6714 79.6203 92.9475 84.8576 79.6203 75.0878 127.7719 79.6203 62.5382
0.01 63.5879 75.2544 88.3594 80.5051 75.2544 70.4416 118.6729 75.2544 59.6859
0.02 60.8109 71.9124 85.0592 77.3993 71.9124 66.9878 110.9534 71.9124 57.6477
0.03 58.8915 68.8722 82.6363 75.0959 68.8722 64.5996 105.1919 68.8722 56.1854
Table 1 Critical wealth levels xˆ for various parameter values of δ, µ, σ, and K. Parameter values are set as
follows: β = 0.0371, r= 0.0371, µ= 0.1123, σ= 0.1954, K = 3, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10.
4.1. Baseline Parameters
The baseline parameters are fixed to r= 3.71%, which is the annual rate of return from rolling over
1-month T-bills during the time period of 1926-200918 and we assume β has the same value as r.
We utilize µ= 11.23% and σ= 19.54%, which are the return and standard deviation of the world’s
large stocks during the time period of 1926-2009.19 We set K = 3 following the assumption used by
Dybvig and Liu (2010), I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10 following the results of Lynch and Tan (2011), who
conclude the unemployment state pays only 10% of permanent labor income.
4.2. Critical Wealth Level
Table 1 shows critical wealth level xˆ’s for various parameter values, such as forced unemployment
intensity δ, expected rate µ of stock return, stock volatility σ, and leisure K. It is obvious that
an individual would be better off entering voluntary retirement wherever her wealth level is not
less than xˆ, so that she can enjoy more leisure after retirement. Table 1 shows that such critical
wealth level xˆ decreases as forced unemployment intensity δ increases. Intuitively, individuals with
a higher δ enter the voluntary retirement stage earlier even though the wealth level at retirement
is not relatively high, because they willingly submit to such utility losses in exchange for avoiding
utility losses stemming from forced unemployment risks.
On the other hand, the critical wealth level increases as µ increases or σ or K decreases, ceteris
paribus. After retirement, an individual in our model faces a tradeoff between utility gains owing
to the increase of leisure and utility losses from the significant reduction of income. In a finan-
cial market with a higher expected rate of stock return, an individual is willing to postpone her
voluntary retirement because a better investment opportunity makes her worry less about forced
unemployment risks. Similarly, a lower stock volatility also provides her with a better investment
opportunity, so she worries less about forced unemployment risks. Evidently, a lower quantity of
leisure after retirement hinders an individual from entering voluntary early retirement.
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Figure 1 Optimal consumption and risky investment as a function of initial wealth. Parameter values are set as
follows: β = 0.0371, r= 0.0371, µ= 0.1123, σ= 0.1954, K = 3, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10.
4.3. Optimal Consumption and Risky Investment
Figure 1 shows the amounts of optimal consumption and investment in the risky stock as a function
of initial wealth for several values of forced unemployment intensity δ. An individual’s consumption
c grows as initial wealth level x becomes higher, but it falls as her forced unemployment possibility
δ grows. A higher demand on precautionary savings against a higher forced unemployment risk
could be an explanation of the latter observation. (See Carroll, 1992; Malley and Moutos, 1996;
Gruber, 1997).20
In terms of optimal risky investment, Figure 1 shows an interesting feature. Admittedly, if wealth
is not small enough, the optimal risky investment increases as initial wealth increases. However,
for poor people this might not be true; up to some wealth level, some of them with a higher forced
unemployment possibility lessen their investment in the risky stock even though they have more
wealth. This observation implies that forced unemployment risks could be an important explanation
for the findings of Benzoni et al. (2007) and Lynch and Tan (2011), in that they find the stock
holdings can increase at a sufficiently low wealth level. Moreover, the result seems to be consistent
with that of Cocco et al. (2005), who address whether the amount of optimal risky investment can
rise due to unemployment risks when wealth level is low enough.
Figure 2 says that optimal consumption to wealth ratio and optimal risky investment to wealth
ratio decrease at decreasing rates as retirement time approaches, or equivalently, as x goes to xˆ.21
The decreasing properties of optimal consumption and risky investment with respect to wealth ratio
seem to result from the intense aspirations toward voluntary early retirement under our set-up.
Notice also that the decreasing rate becomes bigger as forced unemployment possibility δ increases.
This fact indicates that our model can reflect the higher intense aspirations toward voluntary early
retirement of an individual facing a higher forced unemployment risk.
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Figure 2 Optimal consumption to wealth ratio and optimal risky investment to wealth ratio as a function of
initial wealth originated by the critical wealth level xˆ. Parameter values are set as follows: β = 0.0371,
r= 0.0371, µ= 0.1123, σ= 0.1954, K = 3, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10.
The second result in Figure 2 is compatible with the observation of Polkovnichenko (2007):
an individual with a higher unemployment risks has to invest more in stock by using savings to
finance consumption, because she cannot expand income much by choosing labor supply in the
unemployment state. Economists have a consensus that the flexibility in labor supply causes higher
investment in stock (e.g., Bodie et al., 1992), and our model says that forced unemployment risks
might lead to a much higher allocation to stock when the wealth of an individual is close to the
critical wealth level.
4.4. Certainty Equivalent Wealth Gain
We define certainty equivalent wealth gain (henceforth, CEWG) to be the maximum wealth level
that an individual in our model is willing to give up in exchange for the market without forced
unemployment risks. We now investigate how much CEWG is in a normal economic situation and
how sensitive CEWG is when µ, σ, and K change.
Definition 1. ∆(x) is the certainty equivalent wealth gain at initial wealth level x if it satisfies
φ¯(x−∆(x)) = φ(x),
where φ¯(x) is the value function φ(x) with δ= 0.
Figure 3 represents CEWG as a function of initial wealth level. It decreases as wealth increases,
implying that individuals become less sensitive to forced unemployment risks as they accumulate
wealth. Intuitively, an individual confronting forced unemployment risks would be disentangled
from those near the critical wealth level, because the possibility of unemployment for the small
period is very low and she can retire soon. Thus, CEWG becomes smallest when wealth approaches
the critical wealth level. Moreover, the value of CEWG becomes bigger as δ increases. A smaller
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Figure 3 Certainty equivalent wealth gain to wealth ratio ∆(x)/x as a function of initial wealth x. Parameter
values are set as follows: β = 0.0371, r= 0.0371, µ= 0.1123, σ= 0.1954, K = 3, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10.
δ= 0.01 δ= 0.02 δ= 0.03
x \µ 0.1023 0.1223 0.1023 0.1223 0.1023 0.1223
xˆ− 50 0.0889 0.0218 0.1986 0.0435 0.3328 0.0658
xˆ− 40 0.0398 0.0135 0.0885 0.0287 0.1321 0.0450
xˆ− 30 0.0208 0.0090 0.0460 0.0174 0.0699 0.0255
xˆ− 20 0.0121 0.0063 0.0231 0.0135 0.0340 0.0194
xˆ− 15 0.0076 0.0038 0.0178 0.0085 0.0282 0.0142
xˆ− 10 0.0040 0.0022 0.0087 0.0049 0.0148 0.0077
xˆ− 5 0.0019 0.0011 0.0043 0.0026 0.0072 0.0042
xˆ 0.0006 0.0003 0.002 0.001 0.0038 0.0018
Table 2 Certainty equivalent wealth gain to wealth ratios ∆(x)/x for various µ and δ. Parameter values are set
as follows: β = 0.0371, r= 0.0371, σ= 0.1954, K = 3, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10. xˆ is the critical wealth level which is
different for each δ.
δ means a higher critical wealth level, so the individual has more time to prepare for forced
unemployment risks; thus CEWG should be smaller.
Table 2 and 3 display the sensitivity of CEWG to the changes of expected rate µ of stock
return and stock volatility σ, respectively. We find the values of CEWG for the extensive range of
wealth, [xˆ− 50, xˆ]. It seems that an individual participating in a financial market with a higher
expected stock return and/or a lower stock volatility has a lower CEWG. Intuitively, as investment
opportunity in the financial market grows, individuals facing forced unemployment risks become
less stressful because they are more likely to enter voluntary retirement.
The sensitivity of CEWG for various K, preference for leisure, is illustrated in Figure 4. It seems
that CEWG is much bigger for a bigger preference for leisure if an individual’s wealth is far less
than her critical wealth level. This implies individuals with a higher preference of leisure have more
stress if their wealth level is relatively low compared with their critical wealth level. This tendency
is mitigated as their wealth gets closer to the critical wealth level.
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δ= 0.01 δ= 0.02 δ= 0.03
x \σ 0.1854 0.2054 0.1854 0.2054 0.1854 0.2054
xˆ− 50 0.0310 0.0511 0.0649 0.1202 0.0953 0.1846
xˆ− 40 0.0192 0.0275 0.0373 0.0680 0.0548 0.0866
xˆ− 30 0.0109 0.0151 0.0224 0.0404 0.0350 0.0452
xˆ− 20 0.0069 0.0069 0.0135 0.0252 0.0195 0.0275
xˆ− 15 0.0060 0.0043 0.0115 0.0196 0.0164 0.0146
xˆ− 10 0.0040 0.0027 0.0097 0.0164 0.0146 0.0088
xˆ− 5 0.0018 0.0017 0.0043 0.0143 0.0074 0.0056
xˆ 0.0004 0.0006 0.0012 0.002 0.0021 0.0037
Table 3 Certainty equivalent wealth gain to wealth ratios ∆(x)/x for various σ and δ. Parameter values are set
as follows: β = 0.0371, r= 0.0371, µ= 0.1123, K = 3, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10. xˆ is the critical wealth level which is
different for each δ.
Figure 4 Certainty equivalent wealth gains to wealth ratios ∆(x)/x as a function of initial wealth level.Parameter
values are set as follows: δ= 0.03, β = 0.0371, r= 0.0371, µ= 0.1123, σ= 0.1954, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10.
5. Economic Downturns and Unemployment Risks
In 2000, “Issues in Labor Statistics” published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics questions
whether or not unemployed job leavers who have voluntarily quit their jobs is a meaningful gauge
of confidence in the job market. Some analysts regard the increased number of job leavers as a
meaningful gauge of rising confidence in the job market, and one possible explanation of their
insistence is that it is good for workers to quit their job voluntarily if they have good prospects for
a successful job search.
However, “Issues in Labor Statistics” asserts that the number of unemployed job leavers shows
a counter-cyclical pattern; the proportion of job leavers increases during economic recessions and
decreases during economic expansions and hence the use of unemployed job leavers as a gauge of
confidence in the job market could be problematic. Figure 5 shows this phenomenon intimately, and
our model might give a solid explanation for it. Notice that critical wealth level of an individual in
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Figure 5 Unemployed job leavers as a percent of the labor force (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics). The two
shaded regions stands for US economic recessions quoted by NBER.
our model decreases as forced unemployment risk increases, implying a higher forced unemployment
risk could compel individuals to retire at a lower wealth level. Generally, forced unemployment
risks are relatively high during economic recessions and relatively low during economic expansions,
so we might conclude that soaring forced unemployment risks during economic recessions induce
myopic individuals who have slightly smaller wealth than their critical wealth level planned during
the past economic expansion to enter early retirement.
More specifically, our model can show the behaviors of myopic individuals under different market
conditions. Table 4 shows critical wealth levels for various δ and I1 under two different market
conditions, say, ‘economic expansions’ and ‘economic recessions’. Ang and Bekaert (2002) show
that the expected stock return and stock volatility in the US market was µ= 0.1394 and σ= 0.1313
during the economic expansions and µ = 0.1394 and σ = 0.2600 during the economic recessions,
and we utilize the same parameters for Table 4.22
In the table, myopic individuals who draw up their retirement plan solely reflecting the current
financial market conditions seem to retire at a much lower wealth level during the economic reces-
sions than during the economic expansions, even though the force unemployment possibility and
their income rate do not change. For instance, an individual with I1 = 1 and δ = 0.02 makes a
plan to retire at the wealth level of 206.3668 during the economic expansions, however, the critical
wealth level gets much smaller to 74.2596 during the economic recessions.
Admittedly, a smaller income rate I1 or a bigger forced unemployment possibility δ during eco-
nomic recession periods is most likely to consolidate the reduction of critical wealth level.23 Since
an individual with an asset portfolio and labor income is exposed to a bigger income risk stemming
from forced unemployment events and worse financial market conditions during economic reces-
sions, she inevitably lowers her voluntary retirement wealth level in order to get a relatively higher
utility gain (mostly obtained from more leisure time) after retirement. For example, according to
Alain Bensoussan, Bong-Gyu Jang, and Seyoung Park: Unemployment Risks and Optimal Retirement in an Incomplete Market
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2013-08-441.R2 21
Economic Recessions Economic Expansions
I1 \ δ 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0 0.01 0.02 0.03
1.6 130.8238 123.6475 118.3066 113.8545 351.8848 338.6856 327.7048 318.4957
1.4 114.4709 108.2522 103.6448 99.8449 307.9003 296.6821 287.3554 279.5401
1.2 98.1180 92.8475 88.9635 85.8013 263.9136 254.6262 246.9156 240.4587
1 81.7650 77.4323 74.2596 71.7168 219.9284 212.5128 206.3668 201.2310
0.8 65.4119 62.0041 59.5288 57.5844 175.9424 170.3294 165.6894 161.8225
0.6 49.0590 46.0203 44.7641 43.3963 131.9575 128.0568 124.8480 122.1871
0.4 32.7060 31.0927 29.9535 29.1254 87.9715 85.6640 83.7837 82.2405
Table 4 Critical wealth level xˆ for various δ and I1. Parameter values are set as follows: β = 0.0371, r= 0.0371,
K = 3, µ= 0.1394 (0.1394), σ= 0.2600 (0.1313) are used for the parameter values under Economic Recessions
(Economic Expansions, respectively). I2 is fixed as 10% of I1.
Table 4 a myopic individual with δ= 0.01 and I1 = 1 has the critical wealth level of 212.5128 during
the economic expansions, but the critical wealth level plunges down to 77.4323 if an economic
recession starts. When considering a smaller I1 or higher δ, the reduction of critical wealth level
becomes remarkable.
6. Conclusion
We developed a new approach for solving the optimal retirement problem for an individual with an
unhedgeable income risk. The income risk stems from a forced unemployment event, which occurs
as an exponentially-distributed random shock. The optimal retirement problem is to determine an
individual’s optimal consumption and investment behaviors and optimal retirement time simulta-
neously. Our approach for solving the problem originated from the combination of the DPA and
the convex-duality approach, but we introduced a slightly different convex-dual function of the
individual’s value function from the conventional ones, and we also provided an efficient iterative
numerical method.
Reasonably calibrated parameters show that our model can give an explanation for lower con-
sumption and risky investment behaviors of individuals, and for relatively higher stock holdings
of the poor. Exploiting the concept of CEWG, we glanced at an individual’s optimal behaviors
in changing her wealth level, investment opportunity, and the magnitude of preference of post-
retirement leisure.
Finally, we find our model gives an explanation of a counter-cyclical pattern of the number
of unemployed job leavers. It could provide an evidence that soaring forced unemployment risks
during economic recessions induces people who have slightly smaller wealth than the critical wealth
level planned during the past economic expansion to enter early retirement.
An interesting extension of our paper is to introduce a continuous-time Markov regime-switching
model to discuss the effects of economic recessions and economic expansions on an individual’s
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optimal strategies. We leave solving the retirement problem in a regime switching framework to
the reader as an extension for future research.
7. Appendix
This version of the appendix contains the statements of important theorems without the proofs.
An extended appendix concerning the details of the proofs is available online.
7.1. The Existence of a Solution to (11) and (12)
We assume that the subjective discount rate β equals to the risk-free interest rate r. This assump-
tion is only used when verifying the existence of a solution to (11) and (12). Actually, if one wants
to relax it, it is necessary to take a restriction on the free boundary λˆ to verify the existence. By
taking the assumption of β = r, we can show the existence of a solution to (11) and (12) for any
λˆ > 0. Most importantly, without the verification for the existence of a solution we could find a
numerical solution satisfying (11), (12) and (13) in a wide range of parameters.
We can provide a theorem concerning this issue.
Theorem 2. We assume that β = r. Then for any λˆ > 0, there exists a solution to the problem
formulated by equations in (11) and (12), which has the boundedness such that∫ ∞
λˆ
λ1−n(G′(λ))2dλ≤C∗n
and ∫ ∞
λˆ
λ3−n(G′′(λ))2dλ≤C∗∗n ,
where n is a natural number, C∗n and C
∗∗
n are constants.
7.2. Theorems Described in Section 2.3.2
Theorem 3. (Uniqueness) If
2δ
θ2βλˆ
< 1, the solution of (14) is unique.
The following theorem permits us to take a monotonically-decreasing G(λ) under suitable param-
eter conditions.
Theorem 4. (Monotonicity) Suppose that
I2 ≥ r, 1
β+ δ
+
2
θ2(αδ −α∗δ)
ln (β
I2
r
)> 0,
and
2δαδ
θ2β
(
lnβ+ lnmax
{ 1
βλˆ
,
I2
r
})
<
1
β+ δ
. (24)
Then, any solution of (11) satisfies G′(λ)< 0.
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Theorem 5. (Uniqueness of free boundary λˆ) Suppose
I1 >
θ2
2
δ
β(β+δ)
(1−αδ) + lnK − δβ ln rI2
r
βI2
(1 + αδθ
2
2r
)
+ I2,
δ
β
ln
2δ
θ2
+
2δ
θ2β
(I1− I2)
(
1 +
αδθ
2
2r
)
+
δ
β
ln
(
max
{θ2
2δ
,
I2
r
})
<
θ2
2
δ
β(β+ δ)
(1−αδ) + lnK, and
δ
β
lnβ− θ
2β
2δαδ(β+ δ)
+ e
− θ2β
2δαδ(β+δ) (I1− I2)
(
1 +
αδθ
2
2r
)
+
δ
β
ln
(
max
{ 1
β
e
θ2β
2δαδ(β+δ) ,
I2
r
})
<
θ2
2
δ
β(β+ δ)
(1−αδ) + lnK.
Then there exists a unique solution λˆ of (16) satisfying 0< λˆ<
r
βI2
.
For the unique solution λˆ of (16), the corresponding G(λ) is also the unique solution of (11).
7.3. Verification for the Optimal Stopping Problem
The verification for our optimal stopping problem (4) is executed in the following two steps: we
first verify that the solution, φ(x), to the variational inequality (5) is the solution to the optimal
stopping problem (4). Next, we verify that the solution to the free boundary problem (6) satisfies
the variational inequality (5). We reuse some notations and definitions in Øksendal (2007).
First, we fix a domain G in Rk and let
dYt = b(Yt)dt+σ(Yt)dBt, Y0 = y,
be an Itoˆ diffusion in Rk. Define
τG = τG(y,ω) = inf{t > 0;Yt(ω) /∈G}.
Let f : Rk→R and g : Rk→R be continuous functions satisfying
(a) Ey
[∫ τG
0
f−(Yt)dt
]
<∞ for all y ∈Rk, and
(b) the family {g−(Yτ ); τ stopping time, τ ≤ τG} is uniformly integrable with respect to
the probability law of Yt for all y ∈Rk.
Let T denote the set of all stopping times τ ≤ τG. Consider the following problem: Find Φ(y)
and τ ∗ ∈ T such that
Φ(y) = sup
τ∈T
Jτ (y) = Jτ
∗
(y),
where
Jτ (y) =Ey
[∫ τ
0
f(Yt)dt+ g(Yτ )
]
for τ ∈ T .
Note that since J0(y) = g(y) we have
Φ(y)≥ g(y) for all y ∈G.
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We can now formulate the variational inequalities. As usual we let
L≡LY =
k∑
i=1
bi(y)
∂
∂yi
+
1
2
k∑
i,j=1
(σσT )ij(y)
∂2
∂yi∂yj
be the partial differential operator.
Now, we can state Theorem 10.4.1 in Øksendal (2007).
Theorem 6. (Variational inequalities for optimal stopping)
a) Suppose we can find a function φ :G→R such that
(i) φ∈C1(G)∩C(G)
(ii) φ≥ g on G limt→τ−
G
φ(Yt) = g(YτG)χ{τG<∞} a.s.
Define
D= {x∈G;φ(x)> g(x)}.
Suppose Yt spends 0 time on ∂D a.s., i.e.
(iii) Ey
[∫ τG
0
χ∂D(Yt)dt
]
= 0 for all y ∈G
and suppose that
(iv) ∂D is a Lipschitz surface, i.e. ∂D is locally the graph of a function h :Rk−1→R such that
there exists K <∞ with
|h(x)−h(y)| ≤K|x− y| for all x, y.
Moreover, suppose the following:
(v) φ∈C2(G\∂D) and the second order derivatives of φ are locally bounded near ∂D
(vi) Lφ+ f ≤ 0 on G\D.
Then
φ(y)≥Φ(y) for all y ∈G.
b) Suppose, in addition to the above, that
(vii) Lφ+ f = 0 on D
(viii) τD ≡ inf{t > 0;Yt /∈D}<∞ a.s. the probability law of Yt for all y ∈G
and
(ix) the family {φ(Yτ ); τ ≤ τD, τ ∈ T } is uniformly integrable with respect to the probability law
of Yt for all y ∈G.
Then
φ(y) = Φ(y) = sup
τ∈T
Ey
[∫ τ
0
f(Yt)dt+ g(Yτ )
]
; y ∈G
and
τ ∗ = τD
is an optimal stopping time for this problem.
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Now we recall the optimal stopping problem. For a fixed stopping time τ ,
Φ(x) = max
τ
Jτ (x),
where
Jτ (x) = max
(c,pi)
E
[∫ τ
0
e−(β+δ)t
{
U1
(
c(t)
)
+ δU2
(
X(t)
)}
dt+ e−(β+δ)τU2
(
X(τ)
)]
.
We let c∗(t) and pi∗(t) denote optimal consumption and optimal risky portfolio, respectively. The
partial differential operator
L=
∂
∂t
+
(
rx− c∗(t) + I1 +pi∗(t)σθ
) ∂
∂x
+
1
2
pi∗(t)2σ2
∂2
∂x2
.
In our model, the domain G is given as
G= {(x, t)∈R×R;x>−I1/r, t≥ 0}.
Also, the domain D is
D= {(x, t)∈G; φ˜(x, t)> e−(β+δ)tU2(x)}
for a function φ˜ :G→R. Then
Lφ˜+ e−(β+δ)t
{
U1
(
c∗(t)
)
+ δU2(x)
}
=
∂φ˜
∂t
+
(
rx− c∗(t) + I1 +pi∗(t)σθ
)∂φ˜
∂x
+
1
2
pi∗(t)2σ2
∂2φ˜
∂x2
+ e−(β+δ)t
{
U1
(
c∗(t)
)
+ δU2(x)
}
.
Now we derive variational inequalities for our optimal stopping problem. We suppose that the
function φ˜ satisfies the following variational inequalities:
Lφ˜+ e−(β+δ)t
{
U1
(
c∗(t)
)
+ δU2(x)
}
= 0 on D,
Lφ˜+ e−(β+δ)t
{
U1
(
c∗(t)
)
+ δU2(x)
}
≤ 0 on G\D.
Accordingly, they are equivalent to
Lφ˜+ e−(β+δ)t
{
U1
(
c∗(t)
)
+ δU2(x)
}
≤ 0,
φ˜(x, t)≥ e−(β+δ)tU2(x),[
Lφ˜+ e−(β+δ)t
{
U1
(
c∗(t)
)
+ δU2(x)
}](
φ˜(x, t)− e−(β+δ)tU2(x)
)
= 0.
(25)
We conjecture the form of φ˜ as
φ˜(x, t) = e−(β+δ)tφ(x).
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Substituting it into the inequality (25) we get[
− (β+ δ)φ(x) +
(
rx− c∗(t) + I1 +pi∗(t)σθ
)
φ′(x)
+
1
2
pi∗(t)2σ2φ′′(x) +U1
(
c∗(t)
)
+ δU2(x)
]
≤ 0,
φ(x)≥U2(x),[
− (β+ δ)φ(x) +
(
rx− c∗(t) + I1 +pi∗(t)σθ
)
φ′(x)
+
1
2
pi∗(t)2σ2φ′′(x) +U1
(
c∗(t)
)
+ δU2(x)
](
φ(x)−U2(x)
)
= 0.
Optimality conditions for optimal consumption and risky portfolio are given by
c∗(t) =
1
φ′(x)
and pi∗(t) =− θ
σ
φ′(x)
φ′′(x)
.
Therefore, we obtain the variational inequality (5). Applying Theorem 6, the solution φ(x) to the
variational inequality (5) is the solution Φ(x) to our optimal stopping problem (4).
Next, we provide a theorem verifying that the solution φ(x) to the free boundary problem (6)
satisfies the variational inequality (5).
Theorem 7. If
1
β
r(I1− I2)
I2
(1 +
αδθ
2
2r
)<
θ2
2
δ(1−αδ)
β(β+ δ)
+ lnK and
1
β
e
θ2
2
(1−αδ)
(β+δ) (I1− I2)(1 + αδθ
2
2r
) +
δI2
βr
< lnK
are true, the solution φ(x) to the free boundary problem (6) satisfies the variational inequality (5).
7.4. Convergence of the Iterative Procedure
7.4.1. Proof of the convergence We show that the approximation function G(·) obtained
from the iterative procedure converges to the to the implicit equation (14) by using the Banach
fixed-point theorem.
Consider a set X = [λˆ,∞) which is the domain of λ(·). Since the set R of real numbers is
complete, the set B(X,R) of all bounded functions f :X→R is a complete metric space with the
supremum norm
d(f, g)≡ sup{|f(x)− g(x)| : x∈X}.
Note that the set Cb(X,R) consisting of all continuous bounded functions f :X →R is a closed
subspace of B(X,R), so that, Cb(X,R) is also a complete metric space. Hence, the continuous and
decreasing function G(λ), which is a solution to the differential equation (11) satisfying
0≤G(λ)≤G(λˆ),
should be in Cb(X,R).
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Define for any G(λ)∈Cb(X,R)
T
(
G(λ)
)≡ 1
λ(β+ δ)
+B(λˆ)λ−αδ +
2δ
θ2(αδ −α∗δ)β
[
(αδ − 1)λ−αδ
∫ λ
λˆ
µαδ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
+(α∗δ − 1)λ−α
∗
δ
∫ ∞
λ
µα
∗
δ−2 lnβ
{(
G(µ)− I1
r
)+
+
I2
r
}
dµ
]
,
then T is continuous and T
(
G(λ)
)
is in Cb(X,R) by the relationship of
|T (G(λ))| ≤ 2δ
θ2βλˆ
sup
λ
|G(λ)|.
Moreover, if we take an assumption of
2δ
θ2βλˆ
< 1,
then the map T : Cb(X,R) → Cb(X,R) is a contraction mapping. This is because, for any
G1(λ), G2(λ)∈Cb(X,R), T satisfies the following:
sup
λ
|T (G1(λ))−T (G2(λ))|= 2δ
θ2βλˆ
sup
λ
|G1(λ)−G2(λ)|.
Let Gi(λ) be a function and Bi(λˆi), λˆi be the two constants obtained from the i-th iteration. By
the Banach fixed-point theorem, we have that Gi(λ) converges uniformly to G(λ) on the region of
[λˆ,∞). Obviously, we know that Bi(λˆi)→B(λˆ) and λˆi→ λˆ as i→∞.
We display an example of the numerical experiments in the next subsection.
7.4.2. An example Let Gi(λ) be the numerical solution derived by the i-th iteration. Then
the corresponding value function Φi(x), i= 0,1,2, ..., can be calculated by the first relationship in
(6): for any −I1/r < x< xˆ,
Φi(x) =

1
β
[
rG0
(
λ∗(x)
)
λ∗(x)− θ
2
2
(
G0
(
λ∗(x)
))′(
λ∗(x)
)2− 1− lnλ∗(x)], if i= 0,
1
β+ δ
[
rGi
(
λ∗(x)
)
λ∗(x)− θ
2
2
(
Gi
(
λ∗(x)
))′(
λ∗(x)
)2− 1− lnλ∗(x)
+ δU2
(
Gi
(
λ∗(x)
)− I1/r)], if i= 1,2, ...,
where Gi(·), Bi(λˆi), λˆi are obtained from the iterative procedure in Section 2.3.2. Note that Φ0(x)
represents the value function without forced unemployment risks (i.e., δ = 0). Then Φi(x) (i =
1,2, ...) must satisfy the following inequality: for any −I1/r < x< xˆ,
U2(x)<Φ
i(x)<Φ0(x). (26)
The left inequality comes from the variational inequality of (5) and the right one must hold due
to the fact that the value function without forced unemployment risks is clearly larger than that
with the forced unemployment risks.
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Figure 6 Numerical solutions as a function of initial wealth: δ = 0.01, β = 0.0371, r = 0.0371, µ = 0.1123, σ =
0.1954, K = 3, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10 are used for parameter values.
Figure 6 shows the convergence of the numerical solution for a reasonable parameter set. The
upper bound (lower bound) in the Figure 6 represents Φ0(x) (U2(x), respectively). The figure shows
that Φi(x) converges as the number of iteration increases and the numerical solutions satisfy the
relationships in (26).
Table 5 shows the numerical solutions of Φi(x) (i = 0,1, ...,5) for various initial wealth levels.
It shows that the numerical results apparently seem to be convergent and are bounded by U2(x)
and Φ0(x). On the other hand, if we let λˆi (i = 1,2, ...) be the free boundary obtained from the
i-th iteration, then we can observe in Table 6 that the numerical results for the free boundary
seem to be convergent and stay between the lower bound of λ0δ and the upper bound of λ
1
δ (see the
inequality (17) in Proposition 3.1) for various unemployment intensity δ’s.
lower bound numerical solution upper bound
x U2(x) Φ
1(x) Φ2(x) Φ3(x) Φ4(x) Φ5(x) Φ0(x)
10 63.1217 77.8138 76.4976 76.7837 76.7839 76.7825 77.8959
20 78.7800 85.5165 84.6669 84.9565 84.9435 84.9428 85.732
30 88.6202 91.9625 91.3259 91.6085 91.5910 91.5908 92.1351
40 95.8131 97.4722 96.9468 97.2192 97.1998 97.2004 97.5626
50 101.4850 102.2700 101.8220 102.0880 102.0660 102.0660 102.2820
60 106.1690 106.5140 106.0870 106.3540 106.3310 106.3320 106.4620
Table 5 Numerical solutions for various initial wealth levels: δ= 0.01, β = 0.0371, r= 0.0371, µ= 0.1123,
σ= 0.1954, K = 3, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10 are used for parameter values.
Endnotes
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lower bound numerical result upper bound
δ λ0δ λˆ
1 λˆ2 λˆ3 λˆ4 λˆ5 λ1δ
0.01 0.252839 0.380467 0.342191 0.345989 0.345784 0.345790 0.548594
0.02 0.183758 0.498807 0.335688 0.363804 0.361220 0.361278 0.707226
0.03 0.119902 0.641149 0.304488 0.387526 0.376163 0.376625 0.831393
Table 6 Numerical results of the free boundary λˆ for various unemployment intensity δ’s: β = 0.0371, r= 0.0371,
µ= 0.1123, σ= 0.1954, K = 3, I1 = 1, and I2 = 0.10 are used for parameter values.
1. Cocco et al. (2005) define unemployment state as the state of zero income, however, Gakidis
(1998) shows that even unemployed individuals may have other sources of income (e.g., income
coming from unemployment benefits and social welfare).
2. See the article “Unemployed Job Leavers: A Meaningful Gauge of Confidence in the Job Mar-
ket?” in Issues in Labor Statistics published by US Bureau of Labor Statistics on October 17,
2000.
3. Obviously, it might be reasonable to consider business cycles (therefore, non-myopic investors)
in our model if we want to get some market-consistent results. Usually, researchers take a Markov
regime-switching model to investigate the effect of business cycles on investors’ optimal behaviors,
but solving our problem in a regime-switching framework is much complex because regime risks
are added in our model. In this paper we focus on optimal behaviors of myopic investors, and
leave solving our problem in a regime-switching framework to the reader as an extension for future
research. As a matter of fact, many existing literature analyze myopic investors’ optimal behaviors
(see, e.g., Gompers 1994, Marston and Craven 1998, Edmans 2009) and find out some economically
meaningful results from their behaviors.
4. The forced unemployment time considered in this paper is not an optimal stopping time given
by the set of information of stock price movements but a random time, resulting in market incom-
pleteness.
5. We can allow a correlation between the Brownian motion and the Poisson arrival event as
follows: assume that
probability of {τU ≤ t}=
∫ t
0
δtdt,
where
dδt = δt(µ
δ
tdt+σ
δ
t dW
∗
t ).
Here, µδt and σ
δ
t are functions with respect to time variable t and W
∗
t is a standard Brownian
motion such that
dWt · dW ∗t = ρdt, for ρ∈ [−1,1].
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In this case, however, the stochastic intensity δ can violate the condition of∫ ∞
0
δtdt≤ 1,
because the intensity δ is a stochastic process with a random drift. We leave the problem in the
presence of a correlation between the Brownian motion and the Poisson arrival event as an extension
for future research.
6. Bodie et al. (1992) and Choi et al. (2008) allow a continum of choice between labor and leisure.
However, Farhi and Panageas (2007) and Dybvig and Liu (2010) support empirical evidence that
labor supply is largely indivisible. Concerning leisure choice (or equivalently, labor supply), we take
the assumption of Farhi and Panageas (2007) and Dybvig and Liu (2010).
7. If we take the definition of unemployment in Lynch and Tan (2011), I2 is about 10% of I1.
8. It is possible to consider perceived unemployment risk in determining the discount rate. For
instance, we can replace r by r + δ, and show the discount rate of this type in the individual’s
modified objective function (3).
9. See Dybvig and Liu (2010), and Park and Jang (2014) to find the effects of various wealth
constraints, e.g., a non-negative wealth constraint and a negative wealth constraint respectively,
on an individual’s optimal behaviors. Investigating the effect of a non-negative wealth constraint
with unemployment risk would be an important research subject, and it was examined by Jang
and Park (2015).
10. For the details of the derivation, see an online Appendix.
11. It guarantees the boundedness of the first derivative of the value function everywhere except
zero. Roughly speaking, the investor with such preference is risk-averse for positive values of wealth
and indifferent for how much they borrow up to the wealth constraint of X(t)>−I1
r
. Piecewise
connected utility functions of this kind are seen in lots of articles in economics. For example, Venter
(1983) introduces a utility function which is constant for negative values of wealth, and also says
that it is designed to reflect bankruptcy laws.
12. Bensoussan and Lions (1982) showed the connection between optimal stopping and varia-
tional inequality. For the details of the derivation of the variational inequality for our problem, see
Appendix 7.3.
13. For the details, see Theorem 7 in Appendix 7.3.
14. In Appendix 7.3, we provide the verification theorem for optimal stopping.
15. The reason for why we call the function G the convex-dual function is that it is a dual function
of the marginal utility of objective function φ and a convex function. Actually, the convexity of G
is a conjecture and should be verified. As we compared to the traditional convex-duality approach
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given by Karatzas and Shreve (1998), the verification for the convexity is hardly possible. Instead,
we numerically confirm the convexity of G with a wide range of parameters. Moreover, in Theorem
4 in Appendix 7.2, we have shown the monotonic decreasing property of G. Our objective function
φ is increasing and concave, whereas the function G is decreasing and convex. In this sense, the
function G is a convex-dual function of φ.
16. We can guarantee the uniqueness of G(·) for the case where the condition for Theorem 3 in
Appendix 7.2 holds. However, it is not easy to check whether the condition holds or not because it
contains λˆ which should be determined together with G(·) at the same time. Thus, we conducted
numerical experiments for a wide range of parameters, and we assert that it works well for some
reasonable parameters. Importantly, by utilizing the Banach fixed-point theorem we can verify that
the iterative procedure converges. For the details, see Appendix 7.4. Furthermore, we also display
an example of the numerical experiments in Appendix 7.4.2.
17. This condition of δ is necessary in order to guarantee the uniqueness and existence of the
solution of (14) and to verify that the solution obtained from the new dual approach is a solution
to the variational inequality of (5). We display the possible range of δ in Theorem 3, 5 and 7 in
Appendix 7.2.
18. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
19. Source: pp. 170 of Bodie, Kane, and Marcus (2011)
20. Much empirical literature alludes to precautionary savings against background risks, which
cannot be controlled by an individual and are independent of endogenous risks. (See Kimball,
1992). Background risks consist of two main factors, income risk and housing effect, and Bodie et
al. (1992), Koo (1998), and Heaton and Lucas (2000) emphasize the importance of income risk.
21. The former result is consistent with that of Carroll (1992). According to her, the property
of relatively less increasing consumption at a higher wealth level is mostly due to an individual’s
impatience.
22. These parameters are also used in Jang et al. (2007).
23. Lynch and Tan (2011) find that the first and second moments of labor income growth depend
on business cycles, and Emery et al. (2010) find that in the global crisis the default volume of
corporate issuers skyrocketed. For example, the default rate of Moody’s global speculative-graded
bonds was 13.0% in 2009, which is about three times bigger than 4.4% in the previous year.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Hong Liu, Mark Loewenstein, Min Dai, Steven Kou, Hyeng Keun Koo, Bong Soo
Lee, Young Ho Eom, Jaehoon Hahn, Yong Hyun Shin for helpful suggestions and insightful comments and
the seminar participants at National University of Singapore, Korea University Business School, Yonsei Uni-
versity Business School, Ewha School of Business, Handong University Management and Economics School,
Alain Bensoussan, Bong-Gyu Jang, and Seyoung Park: Unemployment Risks and Optimal Retirement in an Incomplete Market
32 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2013-08-441.R2
and Hankuk University of Foreign Studies Industrial and Management Engineering School. A preliminary
version of the paper was presented at the 2013 China International Conference in Finance and the 2013 Inter-
national Workshop on Quantitative Finance. This article is a revised version of Chapter 1 of Seyoung Park’s
Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the Department of Industrial and Management Engineering, POSTECH.
The research of the 1st author is supported by the Research Grants Council of HKSAR (CityU 500111).
The research of the 2nd and 3rd authors is supported by the Basic Science Research Program through the
National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
(NRF-2013R1A2A2A03068890, NRF-2014S1A3A2036037).
References
Ang A, Bekaert G (2002) International asset allocation with regime shifts. Rev. Financial Stud.
15(4):1137–1187.
Bensoussan A, Lions JL (1982) Application of Variational Inequalities in Stochastic Control. North
Holland.
Benzoni L, Collin-Dufresne P, Glodstein RS (2007) Portfolio choice over the life-cycle when the
stock and labor markets are cointegrated. J. Finance. 62(5):2123–2167.
Bodie Z, Merton RC, Samuelson WF (1992) Labor supply flexibility and portfolio choice in a life
cycle model. J. Economic Dynamics and Control. 16(3-4):427–449.
Bodie Z, Detemple JB, Otruba S, Walter S (2004) Optimal consumption-portfolio choices and
retirement planning. J. Economic Dynamics and Control. 28(6):1115–1148.
Bodie Z, Kane A, Marcus AJ (2011) Investments and Portfolio Management. McGrawHill, Ninth
Edition.
Carroll CD (1992) The buffer-stock theory of saving: some macroeconomic evidence. Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity. 23(2):61–156.
Chacko G, Viceira LM (2005) Dynamic consumption and portfolio choice with stochastic volatility
in incomplete markets. Rev. Financial Stud. 18(4):1369-1402.
Cocco JF, Gomes FJ, Maenhout PJ (2005) Consumption and portfolio choice over the life cycle.
Rev. Financial Stud. 18(2):491–533.
Duffie D, Fleming W, Soner HM, Zariphopoulou T (1997) Hedging in incomplete markets with
HARA utility. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. 21(4-5):753-782.
Dybvig PH, Liu H (2010) Lifetime consumption and investment: retirement and constrained bor-
rowing. J. Economic Theory. 145(3):885–907.
Alain Bensoussan, Bong-Gyu Jang, and Seyoung Park: Unemployment Risks and Optimal Retirement in an Incomplete Market
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2013-08-441.R2 33
Edmans A (2009) Blockholder trading, market efficiency, and managerial myopic. J. Finance.
64(6):2481–2513.
Elmendorf E, Kimball M (2000) Taxation of labor income and the demand for risky assets. Inter-
national Economic Review 41(3):801–832.
Emery K, Ou S, Tennant J (2010) Corporate default and recovery rates, 1920-2009. Moody’s
Investors Service.
Friedman A (1982) Variational Principles and Free-Boundary Problems. Wiley, New York.
Friedman M (1957) A Theory of the Consumption Function. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Farhi E, Panageas S (2007) Saving and investing for early retirement: a theoretical analysis. J.
Financial Econom. 83(1):87–121.
Gakidis H (1998) Stocks for the old? earnings uncertainty and life-cycle portfolio choice. Mimeo.
Gompers PA (1994) The rise and fall of venture capital. Business and Economic History. 23(2):1–
24.
Gormley T, Liu H, Zhou G (2010) Limited participation and consumption- saving puzzles: a simple
explanation and the role of insurance. J. Financial Econom. 96:331–344.
Gruber J (1997) The consumption smoothing benefits of unemployment insurance. American Eco-
nomic Review. 87(1):192–205.
Hall RE (1978) Stochastic implications of the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis: Theory and
evidence. J. Political Econom. 91(6):249–265.
He H, Pearson N (1991) Consumption and portfolio policies with incomplete markets and short-
sale constraints: the infinite dimensional case. J. Economic Theory. 54(2):259–305.
Heaton J, Lucas D (1997) Market frictions, savings behavior and portfolio choice. Macroeconomic
Dynamics. 1(1):76–101.
Heaton J, Lucas D (2000) Portfolio choice and asset prices: the importance of entrepreneurial risk.
J. Finance. 55(3):1163–1198.
Henderson V (2005) Explicit solutions to an optimal portfolio choice problem with stochastic
income. J. Economic Dynamics and Control. 29(7):1237–1266.
Jang BG, Koo HK, Liu H, Loewenstein M (2007) Liquidity premia and transaction costs. J.
Finance. 62(5):2329–2366.
Jang BG, Park S, Rhee Y (2013) Optimal retirement with unemployment risks. J. Banking and
Finance. 37(9):3585-3604.
Alain Bensoussan, Bong-Gyu Jang, and Seyoung Park: Unemployment Risks and Optimal Retirement in an Incomplete Market
34 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2013-08-441.R2
Jang BG, Park S (2015) Consumption, retirement, and asset allocation with unemployment risks
and borrowing constraints. Working paper.
Karatzas I, Lehoczky J, Shreve SE, Xu GL (1991) Martingale and duality methods for utility
maximization in incomplete markets. SIAM J. Control Optim. 29(3):702–730.
Karatzas I, Shreve SE (1998) Methods of Mathematical Finance. Springer, New York.
Keppo J, Meng X, Sullivan MG (2007) A computational scheme for the optimal strategy in an
incomplete market. J. Economic Dynamics and Control. 31(11):3591-3613.
Kim TS, Omberg E (1996) Dynamic nonmyopic portfolio behavior. Rev. Financial Stud. 9(1):141–
161.
Kimball MS (1993) Standard risk aversion. Econometrica. 61(3):589–611.
Koo HK (1998) Consumption and portfolio selection with labor income: a continuous time
approach. Math. Finance. 8(1):49–65.
Liu J, Neis E (2003) Endogenous retirement and portfolio choice. Working Paper.
Liu J (2007) Portfolio selection in stochastic environments. Rev. Financial Stud. 20(1):1–39.
Lynch AW, Tan S (2011) Labor income dynamics at business-cycle frequencies: implications for
portfolio choice. J. Financial Econom. 101(2):333–359.
Malley J, Moutos T (1996) Unemployment and consumption. Oxford Economic Papers. 48:584–
600.
Marston CL, Craven BM (1998) A survey of corporate perceptions of short termism among ana-
lysts and fund managers. European J. Finance. 4(3):223–256.
Merton RC (1969) Lifetime portfolio selection under uncertainty: the continuous-time case. Review
of Economics and Statistics. 51(3):247–257.
Merton RC (1971) Optimal consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-time model. J. Eco-
nomic Theory. 3(4):373–413.
Øksendal B (2007) Stochastic Differential Equations: An Introduction with Applications. Springer,
Fifth Edition.
Park S, Jang BG (2014) Optimal retirement strategy with a negative wealth constraint. Operations
Research Letters. 42(3):208–212.
Polkovnichenko V (2007) Life-cycle portfolio choice with additive habit formation preferences and
uninsurable labor income risk. Rev. Financial Stud. 20(1):83–124.
Alain Bensoussan, Bong-Gyu Jang, and Seyoung Park: Unemployment Risks and Optimal Retirement in an Incomplete Market
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. OPRE-2013-08-441.R2 35
Sangvinatsos A, Wachter J (2005) Does the failure of the expectations hypothesis matter for long-
term investors?. J. Finance. 60(1):179–230.
Svensson LEO, Werner IM (1993) Nontraded assets in incomplete markets. European Economic
Review. 37(5):1149–1168.
Tepla´ L (2000) Optimal hedging and valuation of nontraded assets. European Finance Review.
4:231–251.
Venter GG (1983) Utility with decreasing risk aversion. Proceedings of the Causality Actuarial
Society. 133:144–155.
Viceira LM (2001) Optimal portfolio choice for long-horizon investors with nontradable labor
income. J. Finance. 56(2):433–470.
Wachter JA, Yogo M (2010) Why do household portfolio shares rise in wealth?. Rev. Financial
Stud. 23(11):3929–3965.
